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America’s New Political and Military Orientation 




Commission for Defense Attitudes and Security Issues (CIOR, Ed.), ”A New 
transatlantic Partnership. The European Union and the United States – Partners 
or Competitors?” (Seminar Report, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Wesseling, 11- 










America’s New Political and Military Orientation Towards Asia – A 
Challenge to Transatlantic Ties? 
 




   During the Cold War, the U.S. policy towards Asia was determined by the global 
security challenge, notably the strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union.  During that time, 
Asian states had often to take sides, some even changed sides, and others adopted 
varying degrees of neutrality.  The present security challenge for Asia is rather different: 
how to navigate between the U.S., as the only superpower in the world, and the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC), as a perceived rising great power that may change 
fundamentally the balance of forces in the region, with wide-ranging implications for the 
rest of Asia and the world. 
 
The Benefits of U.S. Policy in Asia 
 
   There is no doubt that a number of Asian nations benefited from American military 
protection, both politically and economically.  Even today they benefit from America’s 
concentration on the security of Persian/Arabian Gulf oil supplies.  Any slowing of oil 
supplies from the Gulf would directly effect the Japanese economy, which is to more 
than 70 percent dependent from oil supplies abroad.  In the past, however, only Japan 
and South Korea have made a major financial commitment to subsidizing America’s 
guardianship of the Gulf and the sea-lanes of communications running through the 
Indian Ocean, the Malacca and Sunda Straits and the South China Sea.  Although some 
Asian governments are diplomatically reticent about stating their support for America’s 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific, any discussions that the U.S. policy might reduce 
its military commitments would be viewed with alarm.  In their view, any reduction in 
U.S. commitment would mean a commensurate increase in China’s power and influence.  
In this regard, U.S. military power in this region is seen by many nations as a necessary 
restraint on China’s ability to assert its national interests, especially Beijing’s claims to 
Taiwan and a considerably larger Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).  
 
Continuation of U.S. Commitments in Asia 
 
   Despite the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained and even strengthened its 
security ties during the last years, particularly with its traditional allies such as Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand.  In both Japan and South Korea, 
the U.S. still has large air force and naval bases.  The Chinese government, however, is 
greatly concerned about the predominant position that the U.S. has gained in world 
power politics after the collapse of the USSR, and is therefore opting for a multipolar 
world.  For this reason it has sought to form a loose political alliance of nations opposed 
to perceived U.S. hegemony, notably with Russia.  But the pronounced “strategic 
partnership” between both countries is in reality only a “tactical alliance” and is 
constrained by diverging interests in East and Central Asia.  In the long-term, as Russian 
general staff officers admit, China may create the major security challenge for Russia, 
considering recent demographic, economic and military trends. 
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New Analysis of Asian Issues 
   In U.S. domestic discussions, the former preoccupation with the Soviet Union and 
Russia has meanwhile been replaced by a perceived looming “China threat”.  China is 
still not perceived as a real threat but is equally not a real strategic partner, as the new 
Bush administration has already declared.  From the U.S. perspective, tensions between 
China and the USA include: 
 
• China’s arms sales (and smuggling) including nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, 
Iran, Iraq and other potential “states of concern” 
• Chinese espionage including theft of US missile secrets which may fasten the nuclear build-
up of China’s ICBM force being able to target US territory 
• A US$90 billion trade surplus (in 1999) in China’s favor which Washington claims is 
exacerbated by China’s restrictions on US imports 
• Human rights violations for dissidents  
• China’s occupation of Tibet 
• Chinese ongoing military pressure on Taiwan 
• China’s EEZ claims in the South China Sea 
• China’s support for the Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq 
• China’s support for the Miloševic government in Yugoslavia. 
 
   From the Chinese point of view the problems in the bilateral relationship with 
Washington include: 
 
• U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs including the so-called human rights issues (i.e. 
NATO’s humanitarian military intervention in Kosovo and the unfortunate U.S. bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade); 
• perceived US containment policies vis-à-vis China (such as the strengthening of US bilateral 
military alliances in Asia and NATO’s PfP programs in Central Asia); 
• US political and military support for Taiwan, 
• Continuing US restrictions on the sale of various technologies, including computer technologies, 
to China; and 
• the US plans to create an anti-missile system for itself (NMD) and with Japan (TMD) and to 
include Taiwan within the defended area. 
 
   Against this background and unresolved security problems in the South China Sea, the 
Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula, European policies and the transatlantic ties 
may be affected by the security challenges in Asia-Pacific for the following reasons: 
• fastening globalization of security policies (particularly in the field of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and of advanced high-tech conventional weaponry); 
• the EU’s own strengthening of economic, political and security ties with the Asia-Pacific (ASEM, 
ARF, CSCAP-processes) and the gap between the EU’s official declarations and the political 
reality of fostering security ties with Asia; 
• diverging transatlantic strategies to include China in the world community; 
• US domestic policies that may still call for new burden sharing obligations for its European allies 
beyond Europe (Middle East etc.); 
• numerous unresolved security challenges of Asia (Korean peninsula, Taiwan Strait, South China 
Sea, Indonesia, piracy problems etc.); 
• the arms build-up and the “arms modernization race” in Asia; 
• the underdevelopment of multilateral security ties in the region; 




New Security Challenges in East Asia 
 
   In the Cold War, the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region was determined in 
large by the major powers - the United States, Russia, China and Japan.  With the end of 
the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the reduction of the U.S. 
military presence in the region, the roles of China, Japan, the United States, Taiwan, both 
Korean states and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries are 
changing in accordance with the new fluid environment and “new uncertainties”.   Apart 
from socio-economic security challenges, these “new uncertainties” can be summarized 
in the following way: 
 
• unresolved historical border and territorial conflicts (like in the South China Sea);  
• proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological warheads as well as 
advanced conventional weapons 
• socio-economic and transnational security challenges (rationalization and decentralization in 
domestic policies, migration, environment, etc.); 
• nationalist tendencies in domestic and foreign policies; 
• China’s growing economic, military and geopolitical weight.  
 
The U.S., Japan, China Triangle 
 
   Japan and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region are particularly concerned by the 
uncertainties in the triangular relationship between the major powers - the United States, 
China and Japan. Any conflictual relationship between these powers might destabilize 
the region at large. While, in the last three years, ASEAN has seemed particularly 
alarmed about the U.S.-China relations, they now worry much more about the China-
Japan relationship in the mid- and long-term. China and Japan have never been great 
powers simultaneously, whilst the emergence of a new great power has historically 
mostly been fraught with tensions in the region, as neighbors and other states see their 
share of international power diminished. Furthermore, both powers have no clearly 
articulated roles, whilst their bilateral relationship is hampered by considerable 
suspicion. If their mistrust increases, it might polarize and destabilize the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
General Regional Progress Endangered 
 
   Overall strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been positive in many respects.  
The region’s recovery from the Asian economic crisis has made progress, particularly in 
South Korea and Thailand.  They have taken initial steps to rebuild prosperous 
economies, but the verdict on the recovery is still out.  Moreover, major security 
conflicts remain unresolved or have produced new instabilities throughout the entire 
region since the early 1990s, such as the conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  At the same time, 
the region is approaching an unprecedented arms race, fueled by new economic growth 
and an increasing globalization of security policies, interregional and global dual-use 
technology transfers. 
   In contrast to Europe and the Soviet-American strategic relationship during the Cold 
War, arms control policies continue to rank low on East Asia’s agenda.  Furthermore, the 
region’s future strategic configuration will be determined by the changing norms of the 
international system, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), preoccupation of the 
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major powers with their own domestic problems, accelerating trends of democratization 
and the spread of market economies, and increasing interregional and interregional 
interdependencies, both economic and political.  
 
Worldwide Implications of Asian Issues - Requires EU Attention 
 
   From a European point of view, it is important to recall that armed conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea could have not only 
regional but global economic and security implications.  Unless carefully managed, 
conflicts in those three theatres have the potential to escalate even into global conflict.  
Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of East Asia’s strategic chessboard, 
crisis and conflict prevention have become urgent requirements for East Asia.  With the 
increasing “globalization of security policies” and acknowledging that present policies 
have not translated into real European influence in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and 
the EU should recognize the imperative to play a more substantial role.  This could 
include the launching of a strategic dialogue with China and Taiwan about the 
consequences of an unprovoked attack or conflict.  The unavoidable globalization of 
both economic and security policies compels Europe - together with the U.S. and Japan - 
to shoulder a greater diplomatic and political burden than it has in the past. 
   Furthermore, Japan is now confronted with an increasing ballistic missile threat from 
China and North Korea, as the North Korean missile test of August 1998 demonstrated.  
At least twelve Chinese and North Korean theater missile systems can now reach Japan. 
 
Security of Sea Lanes and Japan’s Role 
 
   The significance of the South China Sea and open Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs) is crucial for the economic survival of Japan, as well as other North- and 
Southeast Asian nations. More than one-third of the world’s merchant ships sail through 
the Southeast Asia SLOCs and over 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports reportedly pass 
through this region.  No other major power in the world is probably so dependent as 
Japan on the import of raw materials and the export of finished goods to pay for them.  
With the encouragement of the United States and other Western powers, Japan has also 
widened the tasks and missions of its Self Defense Forces by contributing troops to the 
peacekeeping operations of the UN in limited roles (especially in Cambodia in 1991).  
The renewed security treaty with the United States in April 1996 and the negotiations to 
review the “Guidelines for Defense Co-operation” in 1978 are another indicator of 
Japan’s gradually growing political role in East Asia.  This is explained, inter alia, by the 
relative decline of American power and a relative rise of other powers in the region due 
to the evolution of a more pluralist structure of the international system after the end of 
the Cold War. 
 
Increasing Concern over U.S - Chinese - Japanese Relations 
   The public silence in most East Asian states in regard to the Peoples Republic of China 
(PRC) during the Taiwan crisis in 1995-96 contrasted significantly with private relief at 
the demonstration of an American counterbalance to China, but with still remaining 
doubts about its durability.  Other lingering disputes in the areas of human rights and 
China’s non-proliferation policies have plagued U.S.-China relations, which have found 
their expression in the debates over renewing China’s most-favored-nation trade status.  
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Meanwhile, China’s growing trade surplus, which has further increased by 20 per cent to 
almost $60 in 1998 and even $90 in 1999, has therewith surpassed that of Japan with the 
U.S. 
   The immediate specter of the U.S.-China confrontation during the Taiwan crisis and 
the longer-term question of coping with China pose broad and multiple challenges to the 
region and to global stability.  China’s missile firings during the Taiwan crisis in 1995-
96 came dangerously close to major shipping lanes that violated another enduring vital 
American and Japanese security interest: freedom of navigation.  China’s policy of using 
armed forces for pursuing political objectives, the evolution of these new multilateral co-
operation processes in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Council of Security 
Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC) and stability of the Asia-Pacific region still depend on the future national roles, 
missions and challenges within the triangular relationship among the United States, 
China and Japan.  Thus, the question of whether or not the three major powers can 
produce a stable and lasting co-operative relationship has still fundamental implications 
for the entire Asia-Pacific region. 
 
The Redefinition of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance and its Implications for the U.S. 
Role in Asia-Pacific Stability 
 
   The bilateral U.S.-Japanese security alliance has played a key role, for Japan, and for 
international peace and stability in the region and on a global level.  However, the raison 
d’etre for the U.S.-Japan security alliance began to dissipate with the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) and the rusting away of the once mighty Soviet Pacific Fleet.  
Some Japanese scholars and U.S. experts began to doubt the need for a U.S. military 
presence in Japan and particularly in Okinawa.  The first Clinton administration appeared 
more interested in domestic problems and was looking for a reduction in its global 
military burden.  Against this background, the forced withdrawal of the U.S. troops from 
the Philippine military bases in 1992 signaled for many East Asian states the beginning 
of a military-political disengagement and a progressive withdrawal of the United States 
from the region. 
Against this background, experts as well as the public in both Japan and the United 
States began in 1995 to initiate a more intensive debate about the future of the U.S.-
Japanese security alliance.  
   In the absence of an evident threat, the first Clinton administration began to give 
priority to restoring economic competitiveness at home and promoting traditional values 
of democracy and human rights overseas in the wider concept of economic 
interdependence.  In the view of the Chinese political elite, U.S. policy appears to be a 
strategy for keeping China weak and divided, rejecting its status as a great power and the 
legitimacy of the political and ideological regime in Beijing.  It appears to be a U.S 
“containment strategy” to keep China weak. 
 
Evaluation of the Pax-Americana and Continuity in U.S. Policy 
   Nonetheless, the U.S. domestic discussions and the new post-Cold War environment 
have called for a transformation of Pax Americana in Europe and Asia.  They have 
forced the U.S. and Japanese government to redefine the structuring of the bilateral 
security alliance, as well as Japan’s regional and international role, which seems to 
undermine the alliance.  At the same time, Japan’s growing international role and the 
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need to reduce the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific have also become new 
imperatives for the continuation of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and a Pax Americana 
in the wider Asia-Pacific region.  The U.S. role as “balancer” and “broker” in Asia is - as 
in Europe - still necessary in the post-Cold War era.  Given the still existing mistrust 
towards Japan in other Asian states, and increasing nuclear proliferation threats in the 
region and elsewhere, the U.S. is continues as a “cap in the bottle” against the military 
resurgence of Japan, armed with nuclear weapons.  
   In this light, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye in 1995 launched an effort to 
refocus Clinton’s Japan policy away from singular contentious trade issues towards 
renewing the security relationship.  The U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific 
Region, released in February 1995, spelled out in detail the new U.S. strategy of 
engagement in the region and underlined the need for a forward-based troop presence of 
100,000 U.S. troops in East Asia.  The central objectives of the new U.S. strategy are to 
foster political stability, maintain access to regional markets, ensure freedom of 
navigation, and prevent the rise of any hostile inclinations or the development of a policy 
of aggression towards other nations.  It also reflects the economic importance of Asia for 
the U.S.  The region now accounts for more than 40 per cent of U.S. trade - over half a 
trillion dollars annually.  A proper mix of forward-deployed forces, pre-positioned 
equipment, and military interaction is, in the view of U.S. defense experts, still needed.  
   But for the U.S. revisionist Chalmers Johnson, only “an end to Japan’s protectorate 
status will create the necessary domestic political conditions for Japan to assume a 
balanced security role in regional and global affairs”.   In this light, he has repeatedly 
favored the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan in general and Okinawa in particular.  
Together with isolationists and Sino-centric Asian strategists, revisionists like Chalmers 
Johnson have thus increasingly criticized the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, Japan’s 
“free riding” on the alliance and any U.S. military entanglement in Asia.  But hitherto, 
those critics of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance still represent a minority in the U.S. 
strategic community. 
 
The U.S. - Japanese Alliance 
   The U.S.-Japan alliance and the other four solid bilateral defense relations of the U.S. 
with the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and South Korea remain the bedrock of security 
and stability in the region as the official U.S. East Asia Strategy Report 1998 has 
confirmed: “The United States will remain globally engaged to shape the international 
environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain 
future.”  These bilateral defense alliances provide a reliable insurance mechanism if 
preventive diplomacy should fail, as is the case in Europe with NATO and its 
interlocking institutions of OSCE and the EU/WEU. 
   The U.S. and Japan need to demonstrate that the aim of their alliance is the 
preservation of security rather than the containment of China. At the same time, Japan 
should play a constructive and visible role in the multilateral security institutions for 
easing tensions on the Korean peninsula or in other potential flashpoints. Therefore, the 
U.S.-Japanese security alliance must be harmonized with the U.S.-South Korean alliance.  
The U.S. can neither address the proliferation challenges on the Korean peninsula or 
other security challenges in the region nor can it credibly engage China or maintain open 
and SLOCs without Japanese assistance.  Such a harmonization between these two 
security alliances has also important foreign, security and defense implications for Japan 
and South Korea. It would also allow a greater bilateral and trilateral security and 
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defense co-operation towards the North Korean security challenges on the peninsula and 
significantly open a way for a much closer relationship between Japan and South Korea.  
   Given its traditional strategic security culture of “reluctant realism” as a guiding 
determining factor and philosophy of Japan’s international relations after World War 
Two, Japan will to some extent still remain a “reluctant power” in the foreseeable future.  
Institutional enhancements such as the establishment of the Japan Defense Intelligence 
Headquarters in 1997 and a strategic planning unit in 1998 are also indicators of a more 
active national and independent defense policy.  To this extent, the Japanese role within 
the alliance is clearly growing, and Japan is at the same time becoming a more equal 
partner for the U.S., into the 21st century.  In this regard, Japan is following Germany’s 
growing role in Europe and NATO. 
 
Perspectives of the Asia-Pacific Region: A Shifting Balance of Power? - Implications for 
Regional Stability and the Role of Europe 
 
   Despite the fact that the US has retained 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region as 
evidence of its commitment, political errors or misconceptions seem to have driven 
Southeast Asian countries closer to China and Japan.  Washington’s muted response to 
the regional economic crisis added to old suspicions and fuelled conspiracy theories and 
anti-American sentiment. It was particularly the slow speed of the US response that 
made it possible for China to strengthen its influence at the expense of the US and as a 
counterweight to the US-Japan alliance.  It looked as though the balance of political 
influence had increasingly tipped in favor of China, which was trying to capitalize on 
ASEAN’s weakness and Japan’s lack of leadership. 
   In reality, however, neither Japan nor China have replaced the US as a stabilizing 
force, principal balancer, and “benign hegemon” in the region, nor will they do so in the 
foreseeable future.  China certainly has the political will to take over this role, but it still 
lacks the economic power to assume Japan’s role as an economic leader.  Beijing will be 
confronted with unprecedented socio-economic challenges that could severely impact on 
the stability of the PRC’s political system.  China is also suffering from widespread 
unemployment with 100-130 million people. 
 
The USA Remains the Stabilizing Factor 
 
   In the security field, the US as a “status quo power” had expanded its military-to-
military cooperation not only with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan but also with 
ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.  Maintaining the 
forward presence of the US armed forces in the Asia-Pacific has been facilitated by 
activities such as port calls, repair, joint training, and logistical support. In sum, 
Southeast Asia’s economic, political, and military-strategic dependence on the US has 
increased rather than declined as a result of the multiple crises affecting the region. 
 
Japan or China as Regional Leader and the U.S. Dimension 
 
   Whereas all ASEAN countries perceive China as the major potential long-term threat 
to regional stability, Japan is being viewed in more positive terms as Tokyo does not 
totally dominate regional economies, accepts partners as equals, and does not unilaterally 
extend its military role to Southeast Asia.   
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   Nonetheless, by its own standards, Japan is in the midst of a “revolution” in terms of its 
future regional security and defense policies.  In February 2000, the Japanese foreign 
ministry announced that Tokyo would be willing to contribute armed coastguard vessels 
to multinational anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits. Japan has thus interpreted its 
constitutional notion of “self-defense” as including waters more than 2,000 miles away 
from Tokyo.  The steady extension of the defense perimeter mirrors the strategic 
importance of SLOCs and the South China Sea for the economic survival of Japan as 
well as the increasing strategic and geopolitical rivalry with China in East Asia and 
beyond. Tokyo’s ongoing search for a future role in the region, presently reflected in an 
unprecedented debate over the possible revision of the anti-militaristic and pacifistic 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, is a sign that Japan has been slowly coming to 
grips with a reality it used to deny: “It (Japan) is a great power with strategic interests as 
pressing as its economic ones.” 
   Tokyo can only assume more responsibility by maintaining its alliance with 
Washington and abstaining from unilateral approaches.  Against this background, and 
given China’s suspicion of a redefined US-Japan alliance, Washington and Tokyo need 
to demonstrate that their pact aims to preserve regional peace and stability rather than 
contain the PRC.  Ultimately, regional stability will depend on a strong and sustained US 
engagement.  China’s future internal stability and the direction of its foreign policies as 
well as ASEAN’s political coherence will largely determine to what extent the 
Association will be able to raise its voice in the region and on the global level.  The more 
China follows an assertive or even aggressive policy as it has in the South China Sea, the 
more ASEAN’s relations with the US and Japan, will again assume a greater importance.  
And the more ASEAN becomes dependent on these two powers, the more it will 
ultimately obstruct or reduce its own independent influence in the region and beyond.  In 
such circumstances, the Japan-China-US triangle would acquire even greater importance 
for the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region.  Therefore, Washington’s bilateral 
alliances, supplemented by multilateral security structures will remain the bedrock of 
regional stability.  This is particularly so during times of socio-economic and political 
transition and the rise of China to potentially unprecedented economic, political, and 
military power in the region.  In this context, the US-Japan alliance will remain the 
linchpin of ASEAN’s stability; Japan’s security in general; and preservation, for the time 
being, of Japan’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s non-nuclear weapon status. 
 
Implications for Europe and the Transatlantic Ties 
Against this background, Europe should ask herself whether it makes sense to continue a 
traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific region that is almost exclusively 
defined by economic interests.  This would run counter to the EU’s CFSP and strategic 
security interests in the region and worldwide.  In this context, Europe still has to 
recognize that instability or armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, 
or in the South China Sea will directly and indirectly affect European and global security 
and stability.  Therefore, it is time to define Europe’s strategic and security interests in 
the region as going beyond the present limited functional involvement in support of 
KEDO and multilateral “track one” and “track two” security meetings such as ARF and 
CSCAP.  In regard to the question of impacts on the transatlantic ties, one has to take 
into account that in the U.S. perspective much more and more serious security challenges 
are arising in East Asia (despite NATO’s long-term engagement in Kosovo), especially 
with a rising Chinese power. Therewith, the U.S. will ask the EU to shoulder more of the 
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burden both in Europe and beyond in order to shift its strategic outlook to the Asian 
region (including to South Asia). However, that does not mean automatically that the 
U.S. will withdraw its troops or reduce its military-political engagement in Europe. But 
Washington may even become more political dependent and has to rely on political, 
military and other material support of its NATO allies for new security challenges 
outside of Europe.  Therefore, it needs a strong NATO and the political will and support 
of its European friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
